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Abstract. We propose a new mechanism to preserve privacy while lever-
aging user proﬁles in distributed recommender systems. Our mechanism
relies on (i) an original obfuscation scheme to hide the exact proﬁles of
users without signiﬁcantly decreasing their utility, as well as on (ii) a
randomized dissemination protocol ensuring diﬀerential privacy during
the dissemination process.
We compare our mechanism with a non-private as well as with a fully
private alternative. We consider a real dataset from a user survey and
report on simulations as well as planetlab experiments. We dissect our
results in terms of accuracy and privacy trade-oﬀs, bandwidth consump-
tion, as well as resilience to a censorship attack. In short, our extensive
evaluation shows that our twofold mechanism provides a good trade-oﬀ
between privacy and accuracy, with little overhead and high resilience.
1 Introduction
Collaborative Filtering (CF) leverages interest similarities between users to rec-
ommend relevant content [19]. This helps users manage the ever-growing volume
of data they are exposed to on the Web [8]. But it also introduces a trade-oﬀ
between ensuring user privacy and enabling accurate recommendations. Decen-
tralized collaborative ﬁltering partially addresses this trade-oﬀ by removing the
monopoly of a central entity that could commercially exploit user proﬁles. How-
ever, it introduces new privacy breaches: users may directly access the proﬁles of
other users. Preventing these breaches is the challenge we address in this paper.
We do so in the context of a news-oriented decentralized CF system.
We propose a twofold mechanism: (i) an obfuscation technique applied to user
proﬁles, and (ii) a randomized dissemination protocol satisfying a strong notion
of privacy. Each applies to one of the core components of a decentralized user-
based CF system: clustering and dissemination. Clustering consists in building
an interest-based topology, implicitly connecting users with similar preferences:
it computes the similarity between proﬁles, capturing the opinions of users on
the items they have been exposed to. The dissemination protocol propagates the
items along the resulting topology.
c© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014
G. Noubir and M. Raynal (Eds.): NETYS 2014, LNCS 8593, pp. 169–184, 2014.
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-09581-3 12
170 A. Boutet et al.
Our obfuscation scheme prevents user machines from exchanging their exact
proﬁles while constructing the interest-based topology. We compute similarities
using coarse-grained obfuscated versions of user proﬁles that reveal only the
least sensitive information. To achieve this, we associate each disseminated item
with an item proﬁle. This proﬁle aggregates information from the proﬁles of
users that liked an item along its dissemination path. This reﬂects the interests
of the portion of the network the item has traversed, gathering the tastes of a
community of users that have liked similar items. We use this information to
construct ﬁlters that identify the least sensitive parts of user proﬁles: those that
are the most popular among users with similar interests. Albeit lightweight,
our obfuscation scheme prevents any user from knowing, with certainty, the
exact proﬁle of another user. Interestingly, we achieve this without signiﬁcantly
hampering the quality of recommendation: the obfuscated proﬁle reveals enough
information to connect users with similar interests.
Our dissemination protocol ensures diﬀerential privacy [9]. Diﬀerential pri-
vacy bounds the probability of the output of an algorithm to be sensitive to
the presence of information about a given entity—the interests of a user in our
context—in the input data. We obtain diﬀerential privacy by introducing ran-
domness in the dissemination of items. This prevents malicious players from
guessing the interests of a user from the items she forwards.
We compare our mechanism with a non-private baseline as well as with an
alternative solution that applies diﬀerential privacy to the entire recommen-
dation process. We consider a real dataset from a user survey and report on
simulations as well as planetlab experiments. We dissect our results in terms
of accuracy and privacy trade-oﬀs, bandwith consumption, as well as resilience
to a censorship attack. Our extensive evaluation shows that our twofold mecha-
nism provides a good trade-oﬀ between privacy and accuracy. For instance, by
revealing only the least sensitive 30% of a user proﬁle, and by randomizing dis-
semination with a probability of 0.3, our solution achieves an F1-Score (trade-oﬀ
between precision and recall) of 0.58, against a value of 0.59 for a solution that
discloses all proﬁles, and a value of 0.57 for the diﬀerentially private alternative
in a similar setting. Similarly, malicious users can predict only 26% of the items
in a user’s proﬁle with our solution, and as much as 70% when using the diﬀer-
entially private one. In addition, our mechanism is very resilient to censorship
attacks, unlike the fully diﬀerentially private approach.
2 Setting
We consider a decentralized news-item recommender employing user-based col-
laborative ﬁltering (CF). Its architecture relies on two components: user clus-
tering and item dissemination. We aim to protect users from privacy threats.
User clustering aims at identifying the k nearest neighbors of each user1.
It maintains a dynamic interest-based topology consisting of a directed graph
1 We use the terms ‘node’ and ‘user’ interchangeably to refer to the pair
‘user/machine’.
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G(U,E), where vertices, U = u1, u2, u3, ...un, correspond to users, and edges,
E = e1, e2, e3, ...en, connect users that have the most similar opinions about a
set of items I = i1, i2, ..., im. The system is decentralized: each node records the
interests of its associated user, u, in a user proﬁle, a vector of tuples recording
the opinions of the user on the items she has been exposed to. Each such tuple
Pu =< i, v, t > consists of an item identiﬁer, i, a score value, v, and a timestamp,
t, indicating when the opinion was recorded. Proﬁles track the interests of users
using a sliding window scheme: each node removes from its proﬁle all the tuples
that are older than a speciﬁed time window. This allows the interest-based topol-
ogy to quickly react to emerging interests while quickly forgetting stale ones. We
focus on systems based on binary ratings: a user either likes or dislikes an item.
The interest-based topology exploits two gossip protocols running on each node.
The lower-layer random-peer-sampling (rps) [22] protocol ensures connectivity
by maintaining a continuously changing random graph. The upper-layer cluster-
ing protocol [6,23] starts from this random graph and quickly provides each node
with its k closest neighbors according to a similarity metric. Several similarity
metrics have been proposed [21], we use the Jaccard index in this paper.
Item dissemination exploits the above clustering scheme to drive the dissem-
ination. When a user generates a new item or receives an item she likes, the
associated node assumes that this is an interesting item for other users with
similar interests. It thus forwards the item to its neighbors in the interest-based
topology. If, instead, the user marks an item as dislike, the node drops it.
Privacy Threats. While decentralization removes the prying eyes ofBig-Brother
companies, it leaves those of curious users who might want to discover the per-
sonal tastes of others. In the decentralized item recommender considered, mali-
cious nodes can extract information in twoways: (i) from the proﬁles they exchange
with other nodes (proﬁles contain information about the interests of users); and
(ii) from the predictive nature of the dissemination (a node sends an item only
when it likes it). We consider the Honest-But-Curious adversary model [11] where
malicious nodes can collude to predict interests from received proﬁles but can-
not cheat in the protocol. In Sect. 6.6, we also consider attackers modifying their
obfuscated proﬁles to control their location in the interest-based topology (i.e.
their clustering views).
3 Obfuscation Protocol
Our ﬁrst contribution is an obfuscation protocol that protects user proﬁles by
(i) aggregating their interests with those of similar users, and (ii) revealing only
the least sensitive information to other users. For clarity, this Section describes a
simpliﬁed version of our obfuscation protocol. Section 4 completes this descrip-
tion with features required by our diﬀerentially-private dissemination scheme.
Figure 1 gives an overview of the complete protocol. For space reason, we omit
the pseudocode of the algorithms (available in [5]).
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Fig. 1. Simpliﬁed information ﬂow through the protocol’s data structures.
3.1 Overview
Our protocol relies on random indexing, an incremental dimension reduction
technique [14,24]. To apply it in our context, we associate each item with an
item vector, a random signature generated by its source node. An item vector
consists of a sparse d-dimensional bit array. To generate it, the source of an item
randomly chooses b << d distinct array positions and sets the corresponding
bits to 1. It then attaches the item vector to the item before disseminating it.
Nodes use item vectors when recording information about items in their
obfuscated proﬁles. Let us consider a node A that receives an item R from
another node C. Figure 1 depicts the data ﬂow through the protocol’s data
structures. When receiving R, node A records whether it likes or dislikes the
item in its private proﬁle. A node never shares its private proﬁle. It only uses it
as a basis to build an obfuscated proﬁle whenever it must share interest informa-
tion with other nodes in the clustering process. Nodes remove the items whose
timestamps are outside the latest time window. This ensures that all proﬁles
reﬂect the current interests of the corresponding nodes.
Let us now assume that A receives an item R and likes it. After updating
its private proﬁle, A updates the item proﬁle of R before forwarding it to other
nodes. This corresponds to the operations on the left branch of Fig. 1. A extracts
the items it has liked from its private proﬁle and combines the corresponding
item vectors into a data structure called compact proﬁle. This introduces some
uncertainty because diﬀerent sets of liked items may result in the same compact
proﬁle. Then A updates the item proﬁle of R. This consists of a bitmap that
aggregates the compact proﬁles of the nodes that liked R. To update it, A
combines its own compact proﬁle and R’s old item proﬁle. This makes R’s item
proﬁle an obfuscated summary of the interests of the nodes that like R.
The right branch of Fig. 1 shows how a node, A, builds its obfuscated proﬁle
when required by the clustering process. First, A creates a ﬁlter proﬁle that
aggregates the information contained in the item proﬁles of the items it liked.
Then, it uses this ﬁlter to identify the bits from its compact proﬁle that will
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appear in its obfuscated proﬁle. These consist of the most popular bit positions
among the nodes that liked the same items as A did. This has two advantages.
First, using the most popular bits makes A’s obfuscated proﬁle likely to overlap
with those of similar nodes. Second, these bits carry less information than less
popular ones, which makes them preferable in terms of privacy.
3.2 Profile Updates
Private Profile. A node updates its private proﬁle whenever it generates a
new item or receives an item from another node. In either case, the node inserts
a new tuple into its private proﬁle. This tuple contains the item identiﬁer, its
timestamp (indicating when the item was generated), a score (1 if the node liked
the item, 0 otherwise), its item vector, and the item proﬁle upon receipt. Locally
generated items count as liked and have an empty “item proﬁle upon receipt”.
Compact Profile. Unlike private proﬁles, which contain item identiﬁers and
their associated scores, the compact proﬁle stores liked items in the form of a
d-dimensional bit array. As shown in Fig. 1, a node uses the compact proﬁle both
to update the item proﬁle of an item it likes and to compute its obfuscated proﬁle
when exchanging clustering information with other nodes. In each of these two
cases, the node computes a fresh compact proﬁle as the bitwise OR of the item
vectors of all the liked items in its private proﬁle.
This on demand computation allows the compact proﬁle to take into account
only the items associated with the current time window. It is in fact impossible to
remove an item from an existing compact proﬁle. The reason is that the compact
proﬁle provides a ﬁrst basic form of obfuscation of the interests of a user through
bit collisions: a bit at 1 in the compact proﬁle of a node may in fact result from
any of the liked items whose vectors have the corresponding bit set.
Compact proﬁles bring two clear beneﬁts. First, the presence of bit collisions
makes it harder for attackers to identify the items in a given proﬁle. Second, the
ﬁxed and small size of bit vectors limits the size of the messages exchanged by
the nodes in the system. As evaluated in Sect. 6.7, this drastically reduces the
bandwidth cost of our protocol.
Item Profile. A node never reveals its compact proﬁle. Instead, it injects part
of it into the item proﬁles of the items it likes. Consequently, the item proﬁle
of an item aggregates the interests of the users that liked the item along its
dissemination path. A parameter s controls how much information from the
compact proﬁle nodes include in the item proﬁle.
Let n be a node that liked an item R. When receiving R for the ﬁrst time,
n computes its compact proﬁle as described above. Then, before forwarding R,
n builds an integer vector as the bit-by-bit sum of R’s item proﬁle and n’s
own compact proﬁle. Each entry in this vector has a value in {0, 1, 2}: node n
chooses the s vector positions with the highest values, breaking ties randomly,
and creates a fresh proﬁle for item R by setting the corresponding bits to 1 and
the remaining ones to 0. Finally, when n generates the proﬁle for a new item,
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it simply sets to 1 the values of s bits from those that are set in its compact
proﬁle. This update process ensures that the item proﬁle of each forwarded item
always contains s bits with value 1.
Filter Profile. Nodes compute their ﬁlter proﬁles whenever they need to
exchange clustering information with other nodes. Unlike the other proﬁles asso-
ciated with nodes, this proﬁle consists of a vector of integer values and does not
represent the interests of a user. Rather it captures the interests of the commu-
nity of users that have liked similar items. A node computes the value at each
position in its ﬁlter proﬁle by summing the values of the bits in the correspond-
ing position in the proﬁles of liked items. This causes the ﬁlter proﬁle to record
the popularity of each bit within a community of nodes that liked similar items.
Obfuscated Profiles. As shown in Fig. 1, a node builds its obfuscated proﬁle
by ﬁltering the contents of its compact proﬁle through the ﬁlter proﬁle. This
yields a bit vector that captures the most popular bits in the node’s community
and thus hides the node’s most speciﬁc and unique tastes. The node selects the s
positions that have the highest values in its ﬁlter proﬁle, breaking ties randomly,
and sets the corresponding bits in the obfuscated proﬁle to the values they have
in its compact proﬁle. It then sets all the remaining bits in the obfuscated proﬁle
to 0.
4 Randomized Dissemination
An attacker can discover the opinions of a user by observing the items she for-
wards (Sect. 2). We address this vulnerability through our second contribution:
a diﬀerentially-private randomized dissemination protocol.
The key idea of our protocol is to randomize the forwarding decision: a node
that likes an item drops it with probability pf , while a node that does not like it
forwards it with the same pf . This prevents an attacker from acquiring certainties
about a user’s interests by observing which items she forwards. However, the
attacker could still learn something from the content of the associated item
proﬁles (nodes modify the item proﬁles of the items they like). To ensure that
the whole dissemination protocol does not expose any non-diﬀerentially-private
information, we therefore randomize not only forwarding actions, but also the
item proﬁles associated with forwarded items. This requires us to modify the
protocol described in Sect. 3 as follows.
First, we modify the private proﬁle. For each item, not only do we store
whether the node liked or disliked it, but we also add a new ﬁeld: the random-
ized decision. This ﬁeld stores the forwarding decision taken as a result of the
randomization process (1 for forward and 0 for drop).
We then introduce a new randomized compact proﬁle (as shown in Fig. 2).
The node ﬁlls this proﬁle analogously to the compact proﬁle but it uses the
randomized decision instead of its actual opinion on the item. The node iterates
through all the items for which the randomized decision is 1 and integrates
their item vectors into the randomized compact proﬁle using the same operations
described for the non-randomized one.
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Fig. 2. Complete information ﬂow through the protocol’s data structures.
Finally, the node updates the item proﬁle of an item when it decides to
forward it as a result of randomization, regardless of whether it likes it or not.
Moreover, the node performs this update as described in Sect. 3.2 except that the
node uses its randomized compact proﬁle instead of its compact proﬁle. Nodes
still use their non-randomized compact proﬁle when choosing their neighbors.
In this case, they compare their compact proﬁle with the obfuscated proﬁles of
candidate neighbors.
The above modiﬁcations guarantee that the actual content of the compact
proﬁle never leaks during dissemination. This guarantees that our dissemination
protocol is diﬀerentially private [9]. Roughly speaking, a randomized algorithm
A is -diﬀerentially private if it produces approximately the same output when
applied to two neighboring datasets [10] (i.e. which diﬀer on a single element).
In the context of dissemination, the datasets to randomize are vectors of user
opinions. For space reasons, we omit the proofs, which can be found in [5].
This algorithm bounds the amount of information an observer gets when
receiving an item from a user. Instead of knowing with certainty that the user
liked the item, the observer knows that the user liked it with probability 1− pf .
However, this does not make our solution diﬀerentially private. The dissemina-
tion component is, but it only ensures -diﬀerential privacy when a user expresses
her opinion about an item, not when she generates a new one. In the latter case
the user always forwards the item.
5 Experimental Setup
Dataset. We conducted a survey on 200 news items involving 120 colleagues
and relatives. We selected news items from a set of RSS feeds illustrating various
topics. We exposed each of them to our test users and gathered their opinions
(like/dislike). This provided us with a small but real dataset of users exposed to
exactly the same news items. To scale out our system, we generated 4 instances
of each user and news item in the experiments. While this may introduce a bias,
it does so for both our mechanism and the two solutions we compare against.
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Alternatives. We compare our approach with the following alternatives.
Cleartext proﬁle (CT): This solution does not provide any privacy mecha-
nism. This baseline implements the decentralized CF solution presented in Sect. 2
where user proﬁles are exchanged in clear during the clustering process.
Diﬀerentially private approach (2-DP): This alternative, denoted by 2-DP
in the following, uses the randomized compact proﬁle both for clustering and
for dissemination. In other words, it applies randomization during the entire
recommendation process. In particular, nodes leverage their randomized compact
proﬁles to compute their clustering views. Every time a user expresses an opinion
about an item, 2-DP inverses it with probability pd: this results in a diﬀerentially
private clustering protocol and a diﬀerentially private dissemination protocol.
2-DP extends the privacy guarantee provided by our dissemination protocol
to the management of interest proﬁles. Section 6.6 shows that 2-DP remains more
vulnerable to censorship attacks than our solution.
Recommendation Quality. We evaluate recommendation using recall and
precision. Both measures are in [0, 1]. A recall of 1 means that all interested
users have received the item. Yet, a trivial way to ensure a recall of 1 is to send
all news items to all users, potentially generating spam. Precision captures the
level of spam: a precision of 1 means that all news items reach only users that
are interested in them. The F1-Score captures the trade-oﬀ between these two
metrics [21] as their harmonic mean.
Overhead. We evaluate the overhead of the system in terms of the network traf-
ﬁc it generates. For simulations, we compute the total number of sent messages.
For our implementation, we instead measure the average consumed bandwidth.
A key parameter that determines network traﬃc is the fanout of the dissemi-
nation protocol, i.e. the number of neighbors from the interest-based overlay to
which nodes forward each item.
Privacy. We measure privacy as the ability of a system to hide the proﬁle of a
user from other users. We capture it by means of two metrics. The ﬁrst evaluates
to what extent the obfuscated proﬁle is close to the real one by measuring the
overlap rate between the two using the Jaccard index. The second measures the
fraction of items present in a compact proﬁle out of those that can be predicted
by analyzing the presence of item vectors in the corresponding obfuscated proﬁle.
As item vectors are public, malicious users can leverage them to guess contents
of the obfuscated proﬁles of other users, thereby inferring their interests.
6 Performance Evaluation
We evaluate the ability of our solution to achieve eﬃcient information dissemi-
nation while protecting the proﬁles of its users. We consider both simulations,
and a real implementation deployed on PlanelLab. In both cases, we randomly
select the source of each item among all users. We refer to our solution as OPRD
(Obfuscation Proﬁle and Randomized Dissemination) in the following.
Privacy-Preserving Distributed Collaborative Filtering 177
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0  1  2  3  4  5
F1
-S
co
re
Message (Millions)
b=0.6% of d
b=1% of d
b=2% of d
b=10% of d
CT
(a) F1-Score vs messages
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 0.4  0.45  0.5  0.55  0.6  0.65  0.7  0.75  0.8
R
ec
al
l
Precision
b=0.6% of d
b=1% of d
b=2% of d
b=10% of d
CT
(b) Precision-recall curve
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6.1 Compacting Profiles
As explained in Sect. 3.2, our solution associates each item with a (sparse) item
vector containing b 1’s out of d possible positions. When a user likes an item, we
add the corresponding item vector to her compact proﬁle by performing a bitwise
OR with the current proﬁle. The ratio between b and d aﬀects the probability
of having two items sharing bits at 1 in their vectors, which in turn aﬀects
the accuracy of the similarity computation between users. Figure 3 evaluates its
eﬀect on performance.
Figure 3a shows the values of the F1-Score depending on network traﬃc for
various values of the b-to-d ratio. The points in each curve correspond to a
range of fanout values, the fanout being the number of neighbors to which a
user forwards an item she likes: the larger the fanout the higher the load on
the network. Figure 3b shows instead the corresponding precision-recall curve.
Again, each curve reﬂects a range of fanout values: the larger the fanout, the
higher the recall, and the lower the precision.
Interestingly, the larger the b-to-d ratio, the bigger the diﬀerence between our
solution and CT. With a low b-to-d ratio, it is unlikely for any two item vectors
to contain common bits at 1. As a result, the performance of our solution closely
mimics that of CT. When the b-to-d ratio increases, the number of collisions
between item vectors—cases in which two distinct item vectors have common
bits at 1—also increases. This has two interesting eﬀects on performance.
The ﬁrst is that the F1-Score increases faster with the fanout and thus with
the number of messages: the b = 10% curve climbs to an F1-Score of 0.4 with less
than 400k messages. The curve on Fig. 3b shows that this results from a higher
recall for corresponding precision values (bump in the b = 10% curve). The high
probability of collisions between item vectors results in some user proﬁles being
similar even though they do not contain many common items. This leads to a
topology in which users are less clearly clustered, and in which the items can be
disseminated more easily, which explains the high recall value.
The second eﬀect is that the maximum F1-Score attained by the protocol
with a large b-to-d ratio (to the right of Fig. 3a) stabilizes at lower values.
Figure 3b clariﬁes that this results from a lower maximum recall, as indicated
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Fig. 4. Impact of ﬁltering sensitive information (various ﬁlter sizes, fs)
by the left endpoints of the curves corresponding to high values of b. The arti-
ﬁcial similarities caused by a large b—advantageous with small fanout values
(small number of messages)—also create false clusters that ultimately inhibit
the dissemination of items to large populations of users. This eﬀect is even more
prominent with values of b that set a vast majority of the bits in compact proﬁles
to 1 (not shown in the plot).
In the following, we set d to 500 and b to 5 for our evaluations. The values
assigned to b and d should be computed depending on the expected number of
items per user proﬁle. Explanations about the computation of these values are
outside of the scope of this paper, but are similar to those that relate the number
of hash functions and the size of a bloom ﬁlter [20].
6.2 Filtering Sensitive Information
In our solution, the size of the ﬁlter deﬁnes how much information from the com-
pact proﬁle appears in the obfuscated proﬁle. The larger the ﬁlter, the more the
revealed information. Figure 4a depicts the F1-Score as a function of the num-
ber of messages. The performance increases with the size of the ﬁlter. Figure 4b
shows that this variation comes from the fact that precision strongly decreases
when the ﬁlter size decreases.
6.3 Randomizing the Dissemination
We now evaluate the impact of randomizing the dissemination process in addition
to the obfuscation protocol evaluated above (the previous results were obtained
without randomization). Figure 5a shows the F1-Score for our solution using a
ﬁlter size of 200 and several values for pf . Performance decreases slightly as
we increase the amount of randomness (for clarity, we only show pf = 0 and
pf = 0.5, the other curves being in between). Figure 5b shows that increasing
pf results mostly in a decrease in precision.
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6.4 Evaluating 2-DP
2-DP reverses the opinions of users with a probability, pd, that aﬀects both the
construction of user proﬁles and the dissemination process. This diﬀers from our
solution in which only the dissemination is randomized.
Figure 6a shows the F1-Score of 2-DP versus network traﬃc for various values
of pd. Performance strongly increases at low fanout values for dp = 0.1, but
decreases for larger values. A small amount of randomness proves beneﬁcial and
allows the protocol to disseminate items more eﬀectively with a low fanout. This
eﬀect, however, disappears at high fanouts. Very high values of pd on the other
hand cause a drastic decrease in the F1-Score. Figure 6b shows that increasing
randomness leads to a strong decrease in precision.
Figure 7 compares the F1-Score of OPRD using a ﬁlter of size of 200 and a pf
value of 0.3, with that of CT and 2-DP using a pd of 0.3. We observe that above
2M messages, our solution provides slightly better F1-Score values than 2-DP.
Overall, however, the best performances of the two approaches are comparable.
In the following, we show that this is not the case for their ability to protect
user proﬁles.
6.5 Privacy Versus Accuracy
We evaluate the trade-oﬀ between privacy, measured as the ability to conceal the
exact proﬁles of users, and accuracy for both OPRD and 2-DP. OPRD controls
180 A. Boutet et al.
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0  1  2  3  4  5
F1
-S
co
re
Number of messages (millions)
CT
OPRD, fs=200, pf=0.3
2-DP, pd=0.3
Fig. 7. OPRD vs 2-DP: F1-Score vs number of messages
 0.5
 0.6
 0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5
F1
-S
co
re
Randomness (pf / pd)
OPRD, fs=50
OPRD, fs=100
OPRD, fs=150
OPRD, fs=200
2-DP
(a) Accuracy: OPRD vs 2-DP
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5
O
ve
rla
p 
ra
te
 (J
ac
ca
rd 
ind
ex
)
Randomness (pf / pd)
OPRD, fs=50
OPRD, fs=100
OPRD, fs=150
OPRD, fs=200
2-DP
(b) Public and real proﬁles overlap
Fig. 8. Randomness vs performance and level of privacy
this trade-oﬀ with two parameters: the size of the ﬁlter, and the probability pf .
2-DP controls it by tuning the probability pd to switch the opinion of the user.
Figure 8a compares their recommendation performance by measuring the F1-
Score values for various ﬁlter sizes. The x-axis represents the evolution of the
probabilities pf , for our solution, and pd, for 2-DP. We show that the F1-Score of
2-DP decreases faster than ours. The F1-Score of 2-DP with a pd of at least 0.2 is
smaller than that of our solution with a ﬁlter size greater than 100. In addition,
revealing the most popular 10% of the compact proﬁle (fs = 50) yields similar
performance as 2-DP with pd ≥ 0.3.
Figure 8b measures the level of privacy as the overlap rate (computed with
the Jaccard index) between the compact proﬁle and the obfuscated proﬁle: lower
overlap rate implies more privacy. As our randomized dissemination protocol
hardly impacts the obfuscated proﬁle, our results are almost independent of pf .
2-DP sees instead its similarity decrease with increasing pd. With pd = 0.3, 2-
DP yields an overlap rate of about 0.55 with an F1-Score (from Fig. 8a) of 0.55.
Our approach, on the other hand yields the same overlap rate with a ﬁlter size
between 150 < fs < 200, which corresponds to an F1-Score value of about 0.57.
Figure 9, instead, assesses privacy by measuring if the items in a user’s real
proﬁle can be predicted by an attacker that analyzes the user’s public proﬁle.
Note that in 2-DP, the real proﬁle is the one that would exist without random
perturbations. We evaluate this aspect by measuring the recall and the precision
of predictions. Prediction recall measures the fraction of correctly predicted items
out of those in the compact proﬁle. Prediction precision measures the fraction
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Fig. 9. Proﬁle prediction
of correct predictions out of all the prediction attempts. For our solution, in
Fig. 9a, we use a pf = 0.2 to control the randomized dissemination, and vary
the ﬁlter size. For 2-DP (Fig. 9b), we instead vary pd.
The plots show that while our approach is subject to fairly precise predictions,
these cover only a small fraction of the compact proﬁle with reasonable values
of fs. With fs = 200, the prediction recall is of about 30%. In contrast, 2-
DP exposes a higher number of items from the compact proﬁle. With pd = 0.2
the prediction recall is 0.8 with a prediction precision of 0.6. The curves for
prediction eﬀectiveness, computed as F1-Score values, highlight our approach’s
ability to strike an advantageous balance between privacy and recommendation
performance. The two plots also show the average popularity of the predicted
items. We observe that when the ﬁlter size decreases, the correctly predicted
items are among the most popular ones, which are arguably the least private.
6.6 Resilience to a Censorship Attack
We illustrate the resilience of our obfuscation protocol against censorship by
implementing a simple eclipse attack [18]. A coalition of censors mirrors the
(obfuscated) proﬁle of a target node in order to populate its clustering view.
This is turn isolates it from the remaining nodes since its only neighbors are
all censors. If the user proﬁles are exposed in clear, the proﬁle of the censors
matches exactly that of the target node: this gives censors a very high probability
to enter its view. Once the censors have fully populated the target node’s view,
they simply intercept all the messages sent by the target node, preventing their
dissemination. We evaluate the eﬃciency of this attack with two metrics: the
poisoning rate of the target’s clustering view by attackers; and the fraction of
honest nodes (e.g. not censors) reachable by the target when it sends an item.
We ran this attack for each user in the dataset. The x-axis represents the
users in the experiment sorted by their sensitivity to the attack. Figure 10a and
b depict the results obtained with a cluster size of 50, and 50 censors (we observe
similar results independently of the cluster size). In addition, this experiment
uses a ﬁlter of 125 and pf = 0.2 for our solution, and pd = 0.2 for 2-DP. We
can clearly see that 2-DP is not eﬀective in preventing censorship attacks: only
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150 nodes have a poisoning rate lower than 1. This is because 2-DP computes
similarities using the randomized compact proﬁle, which it also shares with other
users. Therefore 2-DP exhibits exactly the same vulnerability as CT. The censors
can trivially match the proﬁle of the target node.
Our approach is more resilient to this censorship attack. It is diﬃcult for
censors to intercept all messages sent by the target and only a third of the
nodes have a fully poisoned clustering view. The obfuscated proﬁle only reveals
the least sensitive information to other nodes: censors only mirror a coarse-
grained sub part of the target node’s proﬁle. Consequently, their proﬁles are
more likely to resemble those of users with correlated interests than to match
the target proﬁle. Figure 8b conﬁrms this observation by showing the overlap
between obfuscated and compact proﬁles. The resilience of OPRD is driven by
the size of the obfuscation ﬁlter, the smaller the ﬁlter, the more resilient the
protocol.
6.7 Bandwidth Consumption
We also conducted experiments using our prototype with 215 users running on
approximately 110 PlanetLab nodes in order to evaluate the reduction of network
cost resulting from the compactness of our proﬁles. The results in terms of F1-
Score, recall, and precision closely mimic those obtained with our simulations
and are therefore omitted. The bandwidth cost associated with our obfuscated
solution (not depicted for space reason) is about one third of that of the solution
based on cleartext proﬁles [5].
7 Related Work
Privacy is important in many applications. Several approaches [2,17] use ran-
domized distortion techniques to preserve the privacy of sensitive data. However,
[13,15] show that random distortion can seriously compromise privacy. Instead
of adding randomness to user proﬁles, our solution uses coarse-grained proﬁles
that reveal only the least sensitive information. The changes we apply to proﬁles
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are thus not random, but they depend on the interests of users. This makes it
harder to separate privacy sensitive information from the introduced distortion.
Some authors [1] designed a statistical measure of privacy based on diﬀer-
ential entropy. However, it is diﬃcult to evaluate its meaning and its impact
on sensitive data. Diﬀerential privacy was considered in [9,12]. In a distributed
settings, [4] proposed a diﬀerentially private protocol to measure the similarity
between peers. While this solution works well with static proﬁles, its diﬀerential
privacy is not preserved when proﬁles are dynamic as in recommendation sys-
tems. In addition, still in the context of recommendation systems, [16] highlights
the trade-oﬀ between privacy and accuracy.
Other approaches [7] exploit homomorphic encryption in a P2P environment
to secure multi-party computation techniques. Similarly, [3] proposes an archi-
tecture for privacy preserving CF by replacing the single server providing the
service with a coalition of trusted servers.
8 Concluding Remarks
The motivation of this work is to make distributed CF resilient to privacy and
censorship attacks without jeopardizing the quality of recommendation. We pro-
posed a mechanism that relies on two components: (i) an obfuscation scheme
revealing only the least sensitive information in the proﬁles of users, and (ii)
a randomization-based dissemination protocol ensuring diﬀerential privacy dur-
ing the dissemination. We showed the viability of our mechanism by comparing
it with a non-private and a fully (diﬀerentially) private alternative. However,
many questions remain open. In particular, evaluating the fundamental trade-
oﬀs between privacy, resilience to censorship, and recommendation quality con-
stitutes an interesting research direction.
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